Vehicle and method of controlling the same

ABSTRACT

A vehicle includes: at least one memory configured to store at least one default Instruction Structure Key (ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least one processor. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISK and a second default ISK. The processor may generate a random number using the first default ISK, receive the second default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code, and determine the generated ISK as an encryption key for encryption communication of the vehicle when the generated random number and the random number corresponding to the second default ISK are the same.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S)

This application is based on and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119to Korean Patent Application No. 10-2018-0145283, filed on Nov. 22, 2018in the Korean Intellectual Property Office, the disclosure of which isincorporated by reference in its entirety.

TECHNICAL FIELD

Embodiments of the disclosure relate to a vehicle and a method ofcontrolling the vehicle, and more particularly, to a vehicle capable ofproviding encryption communication for entry and starting of thevehicle, and a method of controlling the vehicle.

BACKGROUND

Current vehicles are manufactured with various electronic control units(ECUs) for controlling entry or starting of the vehicle as well as anelectronic control for a driving system. At this time, a typical exampleof the ECU is an Integrated Body Control Unit (IBU), and the IBU maycommunicate with a Smart Key System (SMK).

On the other hand, the IBU mainly uses a Controller Area Network (CAN)communication method as the method for communicating with the SMK. Atthis time, when data to be transmitted and received is exposed to theoutside, a serious problem arises in security.

The disclosure of this section is to provide background of theinvention. Applicant notes that this section may contain informationavailable before this application. However, by providing this section,Applicant does not admit that any information contained in this sectionconstitutes prior art.

SUMMARY

Therefore, aspects of the invention provide a vehicle capable ofproviding an algorithm for preventing encrypted data transmitted andreceived in the vehicle from being exposed to the outside, and a methodof controlling the vehicle.

Aspects of the invention further provide a vehicle capable ofcontrolling power consumption of electronic components using in-vehiclecommunication in response to a shortage of momentary power supply, and amethod of controlling the vehicle.

Additional aspects of the disclosure will be set forth in part in thedescription which follows and, in part, will be obvious from thedescription, or may be learned by practice of the disclosure.

In accordance with an aspect of the disclosure, a vehicle that performsencryption communication, the vehicle including: at least one memoryconfigured to store at least one default Instruction Structure Key(ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least oneprocessor. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISKand a second default ISK. The processor may generate a random numberusing the first default ISK, receive the second default ISK encryptedwith the generated ISK generated based on the pin code, and when thegenerated random number and a random number corresponding to the seconddefault ISK are the same, determine the generated ISK as an encryptionkey for encryption communication of the vehicle.

The generated ISK may be generated by hashing the pin code of thevehicle to Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256.

The at least one processor may include a first processor and a secondprocessor. The first processor may receive a number A that is the randomnumber generated by the second processor, generate the generated ISKbased on the number A, and when the received number A and the randomnumber corresponding to the generated ISK are the same, determine thegenerated ISK as a code for temporary use. The second processor mayreceive a number B that is the random number generated by the firstprocessor, generate 16 bytes based on the number B, and when thereceived number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytesare the same, determine the generated ISK as a code for the encryptioncommunication of the vehicle.

The random number corresponding to the generated ISK may be the randomnumber corresponding to the default ISK encrypted with the generated ISKgenerated based on the pin code.

The 16 bytes may be values obtained by successively arranging 4 lowerbytes of the number B.

When the received number A and the random number corresponding to thegenerated ISK are not the same, the first processor may restore thegenerated ISK to a previous value.

When the received number B and the random number corresponding to the 16bytes are not the same, the second processor may restore the generatedISK to a previous value.

In accordance with another aspect of the disclosure, a method ofcontrolling a vehicle may perform encryption communication using atleast one default Instruction Structure Key (ISK), a generated ISK, anda pin code. The at least one default ISK may include a first default ISKand a second default ISK. The method includes: generating a randomnumber using the first default ISK; receiving the second default ISKencrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code; andwhen the generated random number and the random number corresponding tothe second default ISK are the same, determining the generated ISK as anencryption key for the encryption communication of the vehicle.

The generated ISK may be generated by hashing the pin code of thevehicle to Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256.

The determining of the generated ISK as a code for the encryptioncommunication of the vehicle may include generating a number A that isthe random number; generating the generated ISK based on the number A;when the generated number A and the random number corresponding to thegenerated ISK are the same, determining the generated ISK as the codefor temporary use; generating a number B that is the random number;generating 16 bytes based on the number B; and determining the generatedISK as the code for the encryption communication of the vehicle when thegenerated number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytesare the same.

The random number corresponding to the generated ISK may be the randomnumber corresponding to the default ISK encrypted with the generated ISKgenerated based on the pin code.

The 16 bytes may be values obtained by successively arranging 4 lowerbytes of the number B.

The determining of the generated ISK as the code for temporary use mayinclude restoring the generated ISK to a previous value when thegenerated number A and the random number corresponding to the generatedISK are not the same.

The determining of the generated ISK as the code for the encryptioncommunication of the vehicle may include restoring the generated ISK toa previous value when the generated number B and the random numbercorresponding to the 16 bytes are not the same.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

These and/or other aspects of the disclosure will become apparent andmore readily appreciated from the following description of theembodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings ofwhich:

FIG. 1 is a view illustrating a configuration of a vehicle according toembodiments of the disclosure;

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicleaccording to embodiments of the disclosure;

FIGS. 3 and 4 are flowcharts for describing the flowchart of FIG. 2 inmore detail;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicleaccording to another embodiment of the disclosure;

FIG. 6 is a view for describing a random number and a command that canbe used in a process shown in FIG. 5 ;

FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicleaccording to another embodiment of the disclosure; and

FIG. 8 is a view for describing a random number and a command that canbe used in a process shown in FIG. 7 .

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout thespecification. Not all elements of embodiments of the disclosure will bedescribed, and description of what are commonly known in the art or whatoverlap each other in the embodiments will be omitted. The terms as usedthroughout the specification, such as “˜ part,” “˜ module,” “˜ member,”“˜ block,” etc., may be implemented in software and/or hardware, and aplurality of “˜ parts,” “˜ modules,” “˜ members,” or “˜ blocks” may beimplemented in a single element, or a single “˜ part,” “˜ module,” “˜member,” or “˜ block” may include a plurality of elements.

It will be understood that when an element is referred to as being“connected” to another element, it can be directly or indirectlyconnected to the other element, wherein the indirect connection includes“connection” via a wireless communication network.

Also, when a part “includes” or “comprises” an element, unless there isa particular description contrary thereto, the part may further includeother elements, not excluding the other elements.

Further, when it is stated that a layer is “on” another layer orsubstrate, the layer may be directly on another layer or substrate or athird layer may be disposed therebetween.

It will be understood that, although the terms first, second, third,etc., may be used herein to describe various elements, it should not belimited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish oneelement from another element.

As used herein, the singular forms “a,” “an” and “the” are intended toinclude the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicatesotherwise.

An identification code is used for the convenience of the descriptionbut is not intended to illustrate the order of each step. Each of thesteps may be implemented in an order different from the illustratedorder unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

Prior to the description of the specification, some terms used in thespecification will be clarified.

In the specification, an encryption key is a security means that isprovided in correspondence with a vehicle identification number of avehicle, which can be issued before and after the learning according toembodiments described below, and which can be stored in a memory. Forexample, the vehicle identification number is a value obtained byconverting a vehicle number into a PIN code corresponding to a binarycode, and is uniquely assigned to the vehicle and can be used asidentification information of the vehicle. The encryption key maycorrespond to an Instruction Structure Key (ISK), but the disclosure isnot limited thereto. The encryption key may be included in any data thatcan be exchanged by a processor installed in the vehicle.

For example, the encryption key is the ISK, and a key length of theAdvanced Encryption Standard (AES) can be adopted as at least one of 128bits (16 bytes), 192 bits (24 bytes), and 256 bits (32 bytes).

Meanwhile, the encryption key may include a default ISK and a generatedISK. In embodiments, the default ISK may indicate an ISK value basicallydetermined when the vehicle is first produced. In embodiments, thedefault ISK may refer to the ISK value before the learning, and isdifferent for each vehicle, but has the same initial value between anIdentity Authentication Unit (IAU) and an Integrated Body Control Unit(IBU) of one vehicle.

The generated ISK may indicate the ISK value generated by the learningaccording to embodiments described below. This corresponds to the ISKvalue generated by the IAU's unique generation algorithm.

A random number may refer to data obtained by converting the default ISKor the generated ISK having a 16 bytes value to an arbitrary valuehaving 6 bytes.

Hereinafter, the operation principles and embodiments of the disclosurewill be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a view illustrating a configuration of an apparatus of avehicle according to embodiments of the disclosure for providingencrypted communication.

As illustrated in FIG. 1 , in embodiments, the vehicle may include afirst processor 10, a second processor 20, a lock control module 30, andan electronic key recognizer 40. A first storage 11 and a second storage21 may be connected to the first processor 10 and the second processor20, respectively, to store data related to encryption generated andconverted.

The first processor 10 and the second processor 20 may correspond to acontrol device for the vehicle to perform encryption communication. Itis noted that each of the first processor 10 and the second processor 20may perform the functions and operations of the IAU and the IBU and mayperform the opposite roles. For example, the first processor 10 maycorrespond to a control device newly added for controlling (door lock ordoor release, starting on or starting off) the vehicle to which an entryor starting system using fingerprint authentication is applied. Thesecond processor 20 may correspond to a control device for performingcommunication with an electronic key system.

In embodiments, the electronic key system may include the electronic keyrecognizer 40 and an electronic key 41. The electronic key 41 may referto a signal generating device that can generate frequency signals ofvarious bands in order to perform bidirectional communication with theelectronic key recognizer 40 provided in the vehicle. For example, theelectronic key 41 may be a smart key that can control a remote keysystem of the vehicle.

When a driver holding the electronic key 41 is located around thevehicle, the electronic key recognizer 40 may determine whether a uniqueID built in the electronic key 41 matches ID information stored in theelectronic key recognizer 40 to confirm whether the electronic key 41 isauthenticated. Then, the electronic key recognizer 40 may transmit asignal to the lock control module 30 that allows a locking device 31 ofthe vehicle to enter an unlocked state. Further, when the electronic keyrecognizer 40 determines that the electronic key 41 is not authenticatedwithin a certain radius range with respect to the vehicle, theelectronic key recognizer 40 may transmit a signal to the lock controlmodule 30 that allows the locking device 31 of the vehicle to enter alocked state.

Communication contents between the first processor 10 and the secondprocessor 20 is an authentication result of the electronic key 41, andwhether the electronic key 41 is in the interior of the vehicle. Here,when the communication contents exchanged with each other are exposed tothe outside in the form of raw data, hacking by an outsider isfacilitated, thereby causing a problem in a security system of thevehicle. Therefore, in embodiments, the encryption communication isperformed with a new type of data, rather than the form of the raw data.Here, the new type of data may correspond to the encryption keydescribed below.

The above-described encryption key may be determined through a learningprocess between the first processor 10 and the second processor 20 inorder to be used for the encryption communication of the vehicle. Inaddition, the first processor 10 may transmit the result ofauthentication success or failure to the second processor 20 asencrypted data, and the second processor 20 may transmit the searchresult of the electronic key 41 in the vehicle to the first processor 10as the encrypted data. It should be noted, however, that theabove-described process does not necessarily involve a signaltransmission for the response of the first processor 10.

In embodiments, the vehicle may be implemented with a memory storing analgorithm to control the operation of the components in the vehicle ordata about a program that implements the algorithm, and a processorcarrying out the aforementioned operation using the data stored in thememory. The memory and the processor may be implemented in separatechips. Alternatively, the memory and the processor may be implemented ina single chip.

The first storage 11 and the second storage 21 may be the memoryimplemented as the separate chips from the processor, and may beimplemented as the single chip with the processor.

The electronic components may communicate with each other through avehicle communication network NT. For example, the electronic componentsmay transmit and receive data through Ethernet, Media Oriented SystemsTransport (MOST), Flexray, Controller Area Network (CAN), LocalInterconnect Network (LIN), and the like.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a method of controlling a vehicleaccording to embodiments of the disclosure, and FIGS. 3 and 4 areflowcharts for describing the flowchart of FIG. 2 in more detail.However, it should be understood that these are examples and some of theoperations may be added or omitted if desired.

An IAU 10 may generate the ISK using a pin code stored in the vehicle.The generated ISK may be the default ISK, and the IAU 10 and an IBU 20may initially retain the same default ISKs. Here, the ISK may refer to akey value for performing an encryption and decryption process accordingto AES 128, which is an encryption standard method. In embodiments, thepin code may also refer to an arrangement of letters and numbers that amanufacturer inputs to the vehicle at the time the vehicle was initiallyproduced.

The IAU 10 may receive a command for starting the learning from adiagnostic device (e.g., On-board Diagnostics (OBD) module) of thevehicle and request the IBU 20 to start the learning. In embodiments,the IBU 20 may generate a random number using the default ISK (201). Forexample, the generated random number may be a number A, and may be theencrypted data of 6 bytes. Next, the IBU 20 may transmit the generatednumber A to the IAU 10 (202).

The IAU 10 may generate the generated ISK by hashing the pin code (203),and encrypt the generated ISK to generate the default ISK (204). Here,the generated default ISK may be the same as or different from theinitially held default ISK. Then, the generated default ISK may betransmitted to the IBU 20 (205).

When receiving the generated default ISK, the IBU 20 may determinewhether the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 is the same as the randomnumber received from the IAU 10 (206). The IBU 20 may determine whetherthe received random number is the same as the number A transmitted tothe IAU 10 by performing the decryption process. In embodiments, therandom number received from the IAU 10 may be the encrypted dataobtained by converting the generated default ISK to 6 bytes.

Referring to FIG. 3 , when the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 andthe random number received from the IAU 10 are the same (301), the IBU20 may temporarily store the generated ISK and use the generated ISK asdata for determining the encryption key in a next process (302). Thus,the learning process for determining the encryption key may continue.

Alternatively, when the number A transmitted to the IAU 10 is differentfrom the random number received from the IAU (301), the IBU 20 mayterminate the learning for confirming the encryption key, and restoreall newly generated ISK values to the initial values in theabove-described process (303).

In the above, the process of preliminarily determining the ISK for theencryption key has been described. On the other hand, the process ofdeterministically determining the ISK for the encryption key isdescribed below.

The IAU 10 generates the random number using the generated ISK providedat the IBU 20 (208). Here, the generated random number may be a number Band may be the encrypted data of 6 bytes. Next, the IAU 10 may transmitthe generated number B to the IBU 20 (209).

The IBU 20 may encrypt 16 bytes to generate the generated ISK (210). Inaddition, the IBU 20 may generate the generated ISK by encrypting thenumber B and 16 bytes, e.g., a 16 byte string. Next, the IBU 20 maytransmit the generated ISK generated in the present process to the IAU10 (211). Here, the 16 bytes may correspond to the values in which 4lower bytes of the random number (6 bytes) are successively arranged.

When the generated ISK is received, the IAU 10 may determine whether thenumber B transmitted to the IBU 20 is the same as the random numberreceived from the IBU 20 (212). The IAU 10 may determine whether thenumber B transmitted to the IBU 20 is equal to the received randomnumber received from the IBU 20 by performing the decryption process.Here, the random number received from the IBU 20 may be the encrypteddata obtained by converting the generated ISK into 6 bytes.

Next, referring to FIG. 4 , when the number B transmitted to the IBU 20and the random number received from the IBU 20 are the same (401), theIAU 10 may terminate the learning for determining the encryption key anddetermine the generated ISK as the encryption key (402).

Otherwise, when the number B transmitted to the IBU 20 is different fromthe random number received from the IBU 20 (401), the IBU 20 mayterminate the learning for confirming the encryption key, and restoreall newly generated ISK values to the initial values in theabove-described process (403).

According to embodiments, the processor or multiple processors maygenerate the random number using a first default ISK, and receive asecond default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based onthe pin code. When the generated random number and the random numbercorresponding to the second default ISK are the same, the processor maydetermine the generated ISK as the encryption key for the encryptioncommunication of the vehicle. In embodiments, there would be the firstdefault ISK and the second default ISK, which may mean that the defaultISK values in each of the IAU 10 and the IBU 20 are independent of eachother.

According to another embodiment, the vehicle may include the firstprocessor 10 and the second processor 20. Here, the first processor 10may correspond to the IAU 10 and the second processor 20 may correspondto the IBU 20. In embodiments, the first processor 10 may receive thenumber A, which is the random number generated by the second processor20, and generate the generated ISK based on the number A. When thereceived number A and the random number corresponding to the generatedISK are the same, the first processor 10 may determine a code that usesthe generated ISK temporarily. The second processor 20 may receive thenumber B, which is the random number generated by the first processor10, and generate 16 bytes based on the number B. When the receivednumber B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes are thesame, the second processor 20 may determine the generated ISK as a codefor the encryption communication of the vehicle and use the code as thelast generated ISK defined encryption key. According to the embodiments,by introducing a new authenticator, the encryption key with enhancedsecurity may be used for the encryption communication of the vehicle.

In the above, the encryption key learning method between the IAU 10 andthe IBU 20 has been described. In the following, a learning procedurerelated to the above-described encrypted data is performed and a methodof transmitting the encrypted data by the IAU 10 and the IBU 20 will bedescribed in detail.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart for describing a process of transmitting theencrypted data by the IAU 10. However, it should be understood that thisis an example and some of the operations may be added or omitted ifdesired.

The IAU 10 may receive the authentication result of the locking device31 from the lock control module 30 (501). For example, theauthentication result is whether the door lock or door release of thevehicle has been performed or whether a power supply of the vehicle hasbeen operated. Here, the ISK of the IAU 10 may be the value generated inthe above-described encryption key learning process.

Next, the IAU 10 may inform the IBU 20 that the encrypted data ispresent in a general data format (502), and in response, the IBU 20 maygenerate the random number (503), and receive the command and the randomnumber (504). Referring to FIG. 6 , a key structure of SMKmsg03 601 maybe confirmed as an example of transmitted general data. Here, thecommand is a request value, and the random number may indicate anarbitrary random value.

The IAU 10 may encrypt the received command and the random number (505),and transmit the encrypted data to the IBU 20 (506). Referring to FIG. 6, a key structure of IAUmsg04 602 and IAUmsg05 603 may be confirmed asan example of decrypted data. Here, Result is a result value for therequest, and Recv Random may indicate a random value received at thetime of the request.

Finally, when receiving the encrypted data, the IBU 20 may decrypt theIAUmsg04 602 and the IAUmsg05 603, and confirm whether the transmittedrandom number and the received random number are the same. Inembodiments, when it is determined that they are the same, thetransmission is terminated. When it is determined that they are not thesame, a request signal may be regenerated.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart for describing a process of transmitting theencrypted data by the IBU 20. However, it should be understood that thisis an example and some of the operations may be added or omitted ifdesired.

When the IAU 10 receives the encrypted data from the IBU 20, the IAU 10may transmit the command and the random number to the IBU 20 (701).Referring to FIG. 8 , a key structure of IAUmsg00 801 may be confirmedas the example of data transmitted by the IAU 10.

The IBU 20 may encrypt the received command and the random number (702),and transmit the encrypted random number (703). For example, the IBU 20may transmit the encrypted data based on the command and the randomnumber received from the IAU 10. Referring to FIG. 8 , a key structureof SMKmsg05 802 and SMKmsg06 803 may be confirmed as the example of thedecrypted data. Here, Result is the result value for the request, andRandom may indicate the random value received at the time of therequest.

Finally, when receiving the encrypted data, the IAU 10 may decrypt theSMKmsg05 802 and the SMKmsg06 803, and confirm whether the transmittedrandom number and the received random number are the same. Inembodiments, when it is determined that they are the same, thetransmission is terminated. When it is determined that they are not thesame, the request signal may be regenerated.

According to an aspect of the disclosure as described above, since theprocess of authenticating encrypted data is added by the newlyintroduced IAU and algorithm, the stability of a vehicle security systemcan be enhanced.

Meanwhile, the disclosed embodiments may be implemented in the form of arecording medium storing instructions that are executable by a computer.The instructions may be stored in the form of a program code, and whenexecuted by a processor, the instructions may generate a program moduleto perform operations of the disclosed embodiments. The recording mediummay be implemented as a computer-readable recording medium.

The computer-readable recording medium may include all kinds ofrecording media storing commands that can be interpreted by a computer.For example, the computer-readable recording medium may be ROM, RAM, amagnetic tape, a magnetic disc, flash memory, an optical data storagedevice, etc.

Logical blocks, modules or units described in connection withembodiments disclosed herein can be implemented or performed by acomputing device having at least one processor, at least one memory andat least one communication interface.

The elements of a method, process, or algorithm described in connectionwith embodiments disclosed herein can be embodied directly in hardware,in a software module executed by at least one processor, or in acombination of the two. Computer-executable instructions forimplementing a method, process, or algorithm described in connectionwith embodiments disclosed herein can be stored in a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium.

Embodiments and examples of the disclosure have thus far been describedwith reference to the accompanying drawings. It will be obvious to thoseof ordinary skill in the art that the disclosure may be practiced inother forms than the embodiments as described above without changing thetechnical idea or essential features of the disclosure. The aboveembodiments are only by way of example, and should not be interpreted ina limited sense.

What is claimed is:
 1. A vehicle comprising: at least one memoryconfigured to store at least one default Instruction Structure Key(ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code of the vehicle; and at least oneprocessor, wherein the at least one default ISK comprises a firstdefault ISK and a second default ISK, and wherein the at least oneprocessor is configured to: generate a random number using the firstdefault ISK; receive the second default ISK encrypted with the generatedISK generated based on the pin code; and when the generated randomnumber and a random number corresponding to the second default ISK arethe same, determine the generated ISK as an encryption key forencryption communication of the vehicle, wherein the at least oneprocessor comprises a first processor and a second processor, whereinthe first processor is configured to: receive a number A that is therandom number generated by the second processor; generate the generatedISK based on the number A; and when the received number A and the randomnumber corresponding to the generated ISK are the same, determine thegenerated ISK as a code for temporary use, and wherein the secondprocessor is configured to: receive a number B that is the random numbergenerated by the first processor; generate 16 bytes based on the numberB; and when the received number B and the random number corresponding tothe 16 bytes are the same, determine the generated ISK as a code for theencryption communication of the vehicle.
 2. The vehicle according toclaim 1, wherein the generated ISK is configured to be generated byhashing the pin code of the vehicle to Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256.3. The vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the random numbercorresponding to the generated ISK is the random number corresponding tothe default ISK encrypted with the generated ISK generated based on thepin code.
 4. The vehicle according to claim 1, wherein the 16 bytes arevalues obtained by successively arranging 4 lower bytes of the number B.5. The vehicle according to claim 1, wherein, when the received number Aand the random number corresponding to the generated ISK are not thesame, the first processor is configured to restore the generated ISK toa previous value.
 6. The vehicle according to claim 1, wherein, when thereceived number B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytesare not the same, the second processor is configured to restore thegenerated ISK to a previous value.
 7. A method of controlling a vehiclethat performs encryption communication using at least one defaultInstruction Structure Key (ISK), a generated ISK, and a pin code, themethod comprising: wherein the at least one default ISK comprises afirst default ISK and a second default ISK, and generating a randomnumber using the first default ISK; receiving the second default ISKencrypted with the generated ISK generated based on the pin code; andwhen the generated random number and a random number corresponding tothe second default ISK are the same, determining the generated ISK as anencryption key for encryption communication of the vehicle, wherein thedetermining of the generated ISK as a code for the encryptioncommunication of the vehicle comprises: generating a number A that isthe random number; generating the generated ISK based on the number A;when the generated number A and the random number corresponding to thegenerated ISK are the same, determining the generated ISK as a code fortemporary use; generating a number B that is a random number; generating16 bytes based on the number B; and when the generated number B and therandom number corresponding to the 16 bytes are the same, determiningthe generated ISK as the code for the encryption communication of thevehicle.
 8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the generated ISKis configured to be generated by hashing the pin code of the vehicle toSecure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
 256. 9. The method according to claim 7,wherein the random number corresponding to the generated ISK is therandom number corresponding to the default ISK encrypted with thegenerated ISK generated based on the pin code.
 10. The method accordingto claim 7, wherein the 16 bytes are values obtained by successivelyarranging 4 lower bytes of the number B.
 11. The method according toclaim 7, wherein the determining of the generated ISK as the code fortemporary use comprises: when the generated number A and the randomnumber corresponding to the generated ISK are not the same, restoringthe generated ISK to a previous value.
 12. The method according to claim7, wherein the determining of the generated ISK as the code for theencryption communication of the vehicle comprises: when the generatednumber B and the random number corresponding to the 16 bytes are not thesame, restoring the generated ISK to a previous value.